The idea of constantly increasing specificity resonates well with the increased collection of anthropometric data.
Let's say that we can trace the standard human, as a construct, back to the mid/late-19th century, as Lengwiler (2009) suggests. The assumption is that before statistics (which Lengwiler ties to the development of the standard human), we didn't have the concept of a standard human. So what did we have if not standard humans? Presumably, individual ones. The bulk of Lengwiler's chapter, though, makes an argument for a gradation of standards. With his insurance coverage example, we move from non-standard (coverage determined by the discretion of a doctor) to a binary standard (either you're fit for insurance or you're not) to a gradated standard (different clients get treated differently, based on a set of factors). That's an example of a historic trajectory for a standard: increasing specificity.
If the trajectory of a standard tends to be from nothing to monolithic to binary to granular, then we can quite conveniently frame body scanning as an enactment of granular standard formation. When people scan our bodies for us, they do it for purposes of data collection and standardization (as in the example of SizeUSA), national security (like the TSA), consumer satisfaction (Levi's scanning you to make your perfect jeans)...
What purposes might we have to scan ourselves for our own good? How does scanning ourselves contribute to the trajectory of standardization? What happens if we keep our data to ourselves and don't share it into the aggregate? If we become capable of collecting and storing precise data about our own bodies, is there an onus on us to make productive use of it ourselves, without sharing it? Is it exploitative of others if we compare against existing data but don't share back?
Let's say that we can trace the standard human, as a construct, back to the mid/late-19th century, as Lengwiler (2009) suggests. The assumption is that before statistics (which Lengwiler ties to the development of the standard human), we didn't have the concept of a standard human. So what did we have if not standard humans? Presumably, individual ones. The bulk of Lengwiler's chapter, though, makes an argument for a gradation of standards. With his insurance coverage example, we move from non-standard (coverage determined by the discretion of a doctor) to a binary standard (either you're fit for insurance or you're not) to a gradated standard (different clients get treated differently, based on a set of factors). That's an example of a historic trajectory for a standard: increasing specificity.
If the trajectory of a standard tends to be from nothing to monolithic to binary to granular, then we can quite conveniently frame body scanning as an enactment of granular standard formation. When people scan our bodies for us, they do it for purposes of data collection and standardization (as in the example of SizeUSA), national security (like the TSA), consumer satisfaction (Levi's scanning you to make your perfect jeans)...
What purposes might we have to scan ourselves for our own good? How does scanning ourselves contribute to the trajectory of standardization? What happens if we keep our data to ourselves and don't share it into the aggregate? If we become capable of collecting and storing precise data about our own bodies, is there an onus on us to make productive use of it ourselves, without sharing it? Is it exploitative of others if we compare against existing data but don't share back?